By Charlie Wilson
Current power cuts in North Eastern China have put a spotlight on measures the country has already taken to wean itself off coal dependency for energy.
In the media here, these tend to be mentioned in passing and not elaborated; for fear anyone gets the idea that the Chinese are actually serious about this. In China, by contrast, there is an increasingly serious discussion about how to make the transition to sustainable energy sources while keeping the lights on. Up and down the country there have been conferences on this and related issues over the last year; in a steep, state directed learning curve for everyone concerned.
It is worth watching this discussion here on CGTN, both for the terms in which the discussion takes place, but also the seriousness with which it is taken.
The contrast with the increasing tabloidisation of news and current affairs programmes here is quite apparent. It feels odd now to watch a news programme with serious people discussing a serious issue in a serious way, without having to be on guard for thought being short circuited by the manipulation of images and blowing of dog whistles framing the narrative.
One such is the attack being made by the USA in the run up to the COP and dutifully rehearsed in our media, that the only problem in addressing climate change is China’s dependence on coal. This attack is being made even as the US seeks to authorise 78 million acres of the Gulf of Mexico for offshore oil exploration, issues 2,000 permits for drilling and fracking on federal land, aims to expand Liquified Natural Gas production and gives the go ahead to the Line 3 Tar Sands Oil Pipeline. This is echoed by its UK mini-me, which is about to authorise the Cambo Oil Field in the North Sea and very likely the Cumbria coal mine.
As the speed of the hand can deceive the eye, it is worth looking in detail at the measures that China has already taken to hem in and reduce coal production and use in the transition period, as well as noting the recent announcement of a complete ban on any Chinese finance or construction for new coal infrastructure outside the country.
In March 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued guidelines for regulating coal power development. Unqualified coal power projects were cancelled, 13 provinces and regions were told to “strictly control” new coal capacity and delay the approval of new projects until after 2017 and 15 provinces were told to put off construction of approved coal projects that had not yet started construction.
A traffic light system was introduced based on profitability, capacity and resource constraints (including demands on water and impact on air quality). Under this system, 26 provinces were put on red – no coal development – one (Hubei) on orange – development possible, but companies and local authorities should “tread carefully” – and just three (Jiangxi, Anhui and Hainan) on green – in which development could go ahead without restriction.
Exemptions were made for Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants for residential heating and power, projects in “coal power bases” exporting power to other provinces, and projects supporting poverty reduction in impoverished areas.
In April NDRC and National Energy Agency (NEA) guidelines were issued to accelerate the retirement of coal-fired plants using older, dirtier technology. 28 GW of outdated coal-fired power capacity had been phased out in the previous 12th Five-Year-Plan period (2010-2015). A further 20GW was set for closure in the 13th FYP period (2016-2020). These targets were set by closing all small units ranging from 50 MW to 300 MW capacity that could not meet emission and energy consumption limits after retrofit.
In September the NEA cancelled 15 new coal projects totalling 12.4 GW in 9 provinces, with a further 5GW slated for retirement in October.
In October the NEA released supplementary guidelines suspending construction of plants already started for local use in all red light provinces, and for projects designed to export power to other provinces to “scale down” to about half of the planned capacity for 2020.
In November the 13th Five Year Plan put a cap of 1,100 GW for 2020. That required GW of planned constriction to be scrapped or postponed to meet the target.
In January 2017 the NEA sent letters to 13 provinces to enforce the suspension of over 100 specific coal plants under planning or construction, totalling nearly 100 GW, postponing them to the 14th Five Year period (2021-2025).
In July the NEA released a Guideline that slowed down or halted 185 coal-burning units across 21 provinces, totalling 107 GW. After some provincial political push back, this was slightly reduced to 151 units totalling 93 GW.
In August they announced another 4.7 GW of old plant to be closed down by the end of the year.
While the traffic light system was eased, with 19 regions allowed onto green by 2020, this led to a significant reduction in coal generation in the preceding period and shows that these restrictions have teeth and a real effect. China’s overall dependence on coal fired energy is now 57%; down from over 80% in 2007.
The current power cuts come from a combination of increased demand from manufacturers, a slowdown in coal production, partly caused by improved health and safety measures in mines, and the restrictions put on coal use by national guidelines to restrict carbon emissions. This has slowly been unfolding since March, with factories in Inner Mongolia, Guangdong and elsewhere being ordered to cut consumption to sustain the grid.
Xi Jinping’s pledge at the UN this time last year was to cut China’s carbon intensity by a further 65% by 2030. The NDRC reported in August that only 10 out of 30 regions had met their targets for this in the first six months of the year, which meant that the NDRC
- would stop reviewing proposals for new high energy-consuming projects in those 20 areas for the rest of the year.
- urge local governments to reduce more than 350 planned projects, and take down those that have failed to meet government requirements.
- would work with relevant departments to ensure “no deviation” from central government policy.
They noted that some regions had approved high energy-consumption projects illegally, but also that other industries and companies had set overly ambitious goals, and some financial institutions had cut credit lines for coal power projects.
At the same time, the Politburo said that it would pursue its peak carbon plans in an “orderly” manner and correct any “campaign-style” carbon reduction efforts.
In immediate terms there will be a loosening of restrictions on coal production, but the increased price of coal – as with gas here – could accelerate the transition. As Dimitri De Boer, chief representative in China for environmental organisation ClientEarth put it;
“I think in the short term China must ensure a sufficient supply of coal, to avoid power shortages, especially in the winter, However, this episode also highlights the
limitations of relying on imported coal. It is clear to the central government that the energy mix urgently needs to be diversified, and that the rollout of renewable energy must be as fast as possible”.
The current power cuts come from a combination of increased demand from manufacturers, a slowdown in coal production, partly caused by improved health and safety measures in mines, and the restrictions put on coal use by national guidelines to restrict carbon emissions. This has slowly been unfolding since March, with factories in Inner Mongolia, Guangdong and elsewhere being ordered to cut consumption to sustain the grid.