By Michael Wongsam
Uprising in Kenya
As G7 priorities move decisively toward increased military spending, one of the immediate casualties alongside domestic welfare spending is overseas development assistance. The G7 countries are set to slash overseas development assistance by 28% for 2026 in comparison to 2024. As Michael Roberts has pointed out this would constitute the biggest cut in aid since 1960. The UN estimates that the gap between what is needed for sustainable development and what is delivered to be $4 Trillion.
This reducing financial support is leading to an exacerbation of the debt burden experienced by the world’s poorest countries. “Since 2022, foreign private creditors have extracted nearly $141 billion more in debt service payments from public sector borrowers in developing economies than they disbursed in new financing…3.3 billion people live in countries that fork out more on interest payments than on health.”
This is a problem which has exacerbated since Covid – In 38 percent of countries eligible for development assistance from the World Bank, per capita GDP is lower today than it was before the pandemic—a drop the bank has described as “a historic reversal in development.”
In sub-Saharan Africa, 19 countries are unable to make debt payments or are at high risk of reaching that point. The total value of interest payments made by the world’s 75 poorest countries, more than half of which are in Africa, has quadrupled over the past decade.
These deteriorating conditions form the backdrop to the present youth led uprising in Kenya. Kenya is suffering a catastrophic fall in tax revenues, with every major tax category showing significant decline. The revenue collapse is occurring alongside a debt servicing crisis – the government is spending more on debt servicing (27% of revenue – some sources quote as much 60%) than on health or education.
The government’s response in June 2024 was to drastically reduce tax reliefs and increase fuel duties. On 25 June 2024, thousands of protesters stormed the Kenyan Parliament Building in Nairobi in response to the passing of the Kenya Finance Bill 2024. Placards were raised denouncing the IMF and World Bank. After weeks of protest, with police using live ammunition to fire at protesters, William Ruto dismissed almost the entire cabinet, and withdrew the Bill, instead choosing to cut spending in order to provide funds for debt servicing. The heavy handed policing resulted in the deaths of up to 60 people. The police were investigated following the discovery of mutilated bodies.
In June this year Mass protests erupted following the death in police custody of blogger Albert Ojwang on 9 June. These gave new impetus to nationwide protests called to honour those killed in the June 2024 protests, on the one year anniversary of the storming of the Parliament building. Again, police used live ammunition on the protesters.
It would be a mistake however to believe that such uprisings are special to Kenya. At the moment there are similar uprisings currently in Togo, and Cameroon.
In Togo mass protests erupted following the swearing in of President Faure Gnassingbe in May to the newly created role of President of the Council of Ministers – a role which wields the real power but which has no term limits – whereas the role of President, which Gnassingbe has held since 2005, is relegated to a ceremonial status. Protests have grown steadily in intensity since the inauguration, which protesters are calling a constitutional coup. Protests which were called for the 26, 27 and 28 June saw clashes with the police which left seven people dead.
In Cameroon, mass anti-corruption protests took place against kleptocratic President Paul Biya and in defiance of an official ban. Paul Biya who is 92 years old, has been President since 1982, has abolished term limits to make possible holding office for life.
There are also several instances from the recent past that recall very similar background issues, such as the cost of living crisis in Nigeria in August 2024, or the anti-SARS (Special Anti-Roberry Squad) protests in Nigeria in October 2020. Both of these uprisings resulted in large numbers of fatalities due to heavy handed policing. There was an anti-corruption uprising in Uganda in July 2024.
The Resistance Committees of Sudan, which organised civil disobedience actions against the government of Omar Al-Bashir called for a million man march in June 2019 following the brutal suppression of a mass sit-in against the RSF in which over 100 people were killed. Eight people were killed on the march and over 180 wounded again by live ammunition fire. The Sudanese protests continued until June 2022. In the year following the October 2021 military coup over 100 people had been killed in anti-coup protests. It took the eruption of the civil war to bring the mass protests to a close.
These mass uprisings and more serve to confirm the notion that a generational struggle is taking place pitting young people aspiring for a better life in sovereign countries free from the continuing imperialist plunder for which the elder representatives of the comprador elites provide a transmission belt. This is the contemporary expression of a new wave of Pan-Africanism which is sweeping the continent and which finds inspiration in the trajectory of the AES countries Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Developments in the AES will be discussed below.
US vs China
At the Fourth China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in Changsha, Hunan province (12 – 15 June, 2025), China announced that all African countries will henceforth have zero tariff trade with China across all tariff lines. Additionally, it was announced that there was an intention to move towards a more diversified, high value added model.
This approach is in accord with the new practices being pursued increasingly by several countries – informed by the assertion of economic soverignty – currently gaining prominence in much of Africa as exemplified by the Alliance of Sahel States, Ghana, Botswana, and Namibia.
For comparison the US is following the diametrically opposite approach. The US suspended duty free imports from Africa under its ‘African Growth and Opportunities Act’ (AGOA) on Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariff announcements. The AGOA trade program offered preferential trade terms to selected sub-Saharan African countries for a specified range of goods provided that they meet certain criteria. The program was enacted in 2000 and renewed several times thereafter, most recently extended by the Biden administration until September 2025. It remains to be seen whether Trump will reinstate the provisions of AGOA and thereafter renew its provisions after September.
Since joining the program several countries have become dependent on exports to the US, famously Lesotho, which was hit with a 50% ‘reciprocal’ tariff as a part of the Trump ‘Liberation Day’ announcement. Moreover, in line with the conditions imposed by the US in order to qualify for participation in the program, many countries have been suspended. These include Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, Mali; these have all become unaligned with US interests on the continent.
It can therefore be concluded that China considers strategic engagement and mutually reinforcing development with Africa to be an important factor for its own long-term interests, whereas the US considers Africa only with an eye for the ‘main chance’. For instance, the recently concluded peace deal between the DCR and Rwanda held interest for the US only insofar as there is the possibility of mineral rights.
A few projections point to why that might be the case. The median age in Africa is 18 years, whereas it is 42 in Europe, 35 in the US, and 31 in both Asia and Latin America. By 2050 one in three young people in the world will be African. Moreover, after 2050 Africa will be the only continent with a significantly increasing population – all other continents will have decreasing or stagnant populations. An industrial transition in Africa will be a future driver of world economic growth, both in terms of an expansion of production in Africa and as an expanding market. The role that China plays in developing and financing infrastructure and capital on the African continent is crucial to this industrial transition.
Comparison can be made between the outcome of the Fourth China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo which took place between 12 – 15 June , and the US-Africa Business Summit in Luanda, Angola, which took place a week later in Luanda, Angola between June 22 – 25.
Here, the US was confronted with African leaders delivering one of the most pointed and unified rebukes Washington has faced in recent years. Whereas under Biden’s presidency, from 2021 to 2024, was marked by efforts to strengthen economic ties, promote development partnerships, with ambitious projects like the Lobito Corridor (a major economic route connecting the port of Lobito in Angola to the Katanga province in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Copperbelt in Zambia), uncertainty looms over the future of US involvement amidst the Trump administration’s capricious approach to trade and investment. Within weeks of Trump’s inauguration Washington announced cuts to the US Agency for International Development programs across Africa.
Development projects in infrastructure, agriculture, and health were abruptly halted. The HIV treatment initiatives that once made up the largest global health programme saw funding slashed.
Alongside the aid cuts came a familiar hallmark of Trump’s previous term: strict immigration measures. New travel restrictions targeted several African countries, barring citizens from nations like Chad, Somalia, Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea. With AGOA itself set to expire later this year, African leaders were already nervous about the future of trade ties. The new tariffs compounded those fears, raising the prospect of African economies losing access to one of their largest export markets.
Adding fuel to the controversy, an article published on a major news platform summarising these critical statements disappeared just one hour after going live, sparking speculation that pressure from Washington played a role.
It can be seen that the Changsha and Luanda conferences indicate an equal and diametrically opposite posture towards Africa with China prioritising deepening engagement and the US prioritising further disengagement.
Recent Developments in the Sahel
Following the ejection of French and US military forces from the AES countries and their partnering with the Russian Federation’s Africa Corps, major recent victories have been won against the insurgent forces, notably against JNIM and ISIS-Sahel. This has provoked a crisis of perspective and in-fighting among the insurgents. Recently, 47 trucks carrying cargoes of military grade weapons worth $100 million were seized at the Burkina Faso border, confirming that there is a well funded and organised attempt to destabilise the region.
Furthermore, following the discovery of evidence that Ukraine special forces have been partnering with the insurgents, the AES countries broke diplomatic relations with Ukraine late last year, and sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council denouncing and condemning the support of Ukraine for international terrorism.
The rejection of western influence from the Sahel states has been accompanied by a consolidation of relations especially with Russia. This now transcends security cooperation to now include nuclear energy cooperation agreements between Russia with all three AES countries. Mali and Burkina Faso signed agreements on two successive weeks in June. This holds the prospect of future giant step increases in energy security and energy sovereignty in these electricity impoverished countries.
Burkina Faso has completed the nationalisation of five gold mining assets, and together with its new gold processing plant, is gaining greater sovereignty over its mineral resources, and is building up sovereign gold reserves. Mali has been tightening its grip on its own gold mining sector, recently nationalised two gold mining assets and itself developed a gold refinery partnering with Russia. Niger has nationalised the Uranium mine previously operated by the French company Orano and will partner with Russia in uranium processing.
The AES are jointly creating a new development bank, are issuing joint passports, and are investigating the creation of a new joint currency with the intention of moving away from use of the CFA Franc.
Image: Based on ‘Map of Africa in SVG format. Just the continent of Africa and adjacent African islands.’; Image by Júlio Reis; licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license; map colour changed, text and background added. Final image is also licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license