By Steve Bell
Introduction
Since the start of the 2023 Israeli war on Palestine, the people of Yemen have demonstrated in support of Palestine. The mass rallies and protests, held every Friday, have been as large as almost every other protest across the world. This mobilisation, has been supported and encouraged by the Ansarallah government (correct title for “Houthis”) in Sana’a. This is a reflection of the deep connection between Yemen and Palestine.
In 1947, early opposition to the British colonial authorities was expressed in a three-day strike in Aden against Britain’s support for the Zionist project in Palestine. The same year, Yemen’s UN representatives opposed Palestine’s partition, and walked out when the General Assembly agreed it. In 1971, South Yemeni territory was used by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to attack an Israeli ship. In 1979, the North and South Yemen governments opposed the Camp David Accords. After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, both governments supported the establishment of PLO military camps in Sana’a and Aden. After 1990, the unified Republic of Yemen supported diplomatic recognition of the PLO, and extended equal rights to Palestinian refugees as enjoyed by Yemeni citizens. (1)
Since 2015, the Yemeni people have been subject to a siege and war from the Saudi-led coalition, aided and armed by US, British and French imperialism. This has created conditions of horror and hardship, very similar to those being endured by the Palestinians in Gaza.
Hardly surprising then that the Yemeni people are identifying so strongly with the Palestinians. Both peoples are poor nations facing imperialist backed wars involving sanctions, blockades, hunger, massive death-tolls, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. And, neither peoples show any sign of giving in to their powerful oppressors.
Yemen’s active solidarity
The genocidal character of Israel’s war on Gaza has prompted the broadest international movement of solidarity since the US war on Vietnam. Government led actions have varied from UN General Assembly support for an immediate ceasefire, through governments declaring recognition of the Palestinian state, to the South African action at the International Court Of Justice (supported by a growing number of states). The mass demonstrations, protests, rallies, occupations and campaigns have proved that the movement is popular, not just institutional. Together these have shown that the global majority is with the Palestinians.
Yet, in this truly massive, world-wide movement it has been the actions of one of the poorest countries on the globe that has had one of the most single substantial impacts.
A few days after the war commenced, Israeli munitions struck Al-Ahli hospital in Gaza creating hundreds of deaths and casualties. Disavowing its responsibility at the time, the Israeli government subsequently demonstrated its bad faith by destroying the majority of medical facilities in Gaza.
The Al-Ahli massacre created international outrage. Within hours, under the direction of the Ansarallah government, the Yemeni Armed Forces commenced a programme of harassing bombardment against Israel. This was the first phase of a sustained campaign to end the genocide in Gaza – a justification made explicit by the Yemenis with their duties under the Geneva Conventions, – a justification systematically denied or ignored by western governments and media.
In the first phase of this active solidarity, drones and missiles were launched against Israel from Yemen between October 19th to December 26th. A report from US intelligence sources gives the following assessment of this phase: “While not a single one of these 46 MBRMs [medium-range ballistic missiles], cruise missiles or drones launched by the Houthis in 2023 made it to Israel through the gauntlet of U.S., European, Arab and Israeli air defences, it was nonetheless impressive that the Houthis could launch this many attacks at ranges of up to 1,900 kilometers at relatively short notice, imposing upon Western militaries the mass expenditure of more expensive interceptor systems by the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel.” (2)
The shortcomings of the action led to a new phase, an attempt to interdict shipping heading towards Israel. On November 19th the first success was registered when Yemeni Armed Forces boarded and seized the Galaxy Leader, an Israeli car-carrier. This was towed to Yemen, where it has since been turned into a tourist attraction.
However, the US navy successfully prevented the seizure of the Israeli owned tanker Central Park. Five further attempts in December at seizures were prevented.
Another adjustment in tactics was made. Direct strikes were to be mounted against Israeli ships, or ships engaged in trade with Israel. This had an immediate impact. The IMF’s Portwatch notes a “reduced traffic in the Red Sea since 16 December 2023.”
This was clearly threatening to both the commerce of the Israeli state, and the broader commerce through the Suez Canal. On December 16th, the United States announced a naval task force, titled Operation Prosperity Guardian. This followed the announcement of all of the top-10 shipping and logistics firms to suspend use of the lower and central Red Sea.
Operation Prosperity Guardian, while purportedly to defend freedom of navigation, was essentially a continuation of the imperialist’s support for the Israeli war effort. The states taking part had never opposed the Saudi led obstruction of Yemen’s freedom of navigation. Nor had they ever challenged the Israeli government’s blockade of Palestinian marine commerce.
It was notable that none of the littoral states to the Red Sea chose to take part in the task force. Equally, none of the Arab states agreed to take part. The sole exception being the wretched royal dictatorship in Bahrain – who provides naval bases to the US Fifth Fleet and the British Royal Navy. Even states which have “normalised” relations with Israel understood that the task force would be facilitating the genocide in Gaza.
The Ansarallah government, and Yemeni Armed Forces, continued their military efforts to block Israeli related shipping. As Operation Prosperity Guardian was obviously failing, the US government escalated the conflict. It launched Operation Poseidon Archer with the sole additional participation of the British government. Clearly the majority of states aligned to the US understood the futility of this new step. On January 12, the US and British navies carried out air strikes against onshore targets in Yemen.
The air strikes were quite extensive. Between January 12th and April 24th, there were 40 days when strikes took place, with some days having multiple raids on multiple targets.
Despite this, there was considerable scepticism about the anticipated effectiveness of the attempts to degrade and exhaust the arsenal of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Famously, this was even expressed by President Biden a week after the bombing commenced. He was asked by reporters whether the attacks were working. “Well, when you say working are they stopping the Houthis? No.” He said. “Are they gonna continue? Yes.”
He was hardly alone in such a view. Dr Afzal Ashraf is a visiting fellow at Loughborough University, and served thirty years in UK armed forces. On 4th February, he told the”i” newspaper: “In the long term, it’s hard to say if the Houthis will be deterred, but in the short term it won’t deter them at all. I would describe this as ‘comfort bombing’; it is something the US and Britain do when they feel the need to exert themselves.”
Eugene Gholz, a political science professor at Notre Dame University, told Responsible Statecraft on January 26th: “We might fire multiple missiles to try to intercept one incoming Houthi missile, or we might fire multiple missiles or drop multiple bombs to hit one Houthi target to reduce their capability to launch missiles. Each of these missiles that we fire, let’s say they cost a million dollars or more. That adds up. Let’s say we attack a Houthi radar. Well, the Houthis radars are cheap. Some of their radars seem to be modified commercial radars, things you could pick up at Bass Pro Shop for going out boating. They cost a few thousand apiece, and we’re hitting them with million dollar missiles. This is a bad cost trade off.”
The failure of this belligerent deterrence is evident. In January, after the US and British air strikes, 19 incidents were recorded for the last 19 days of January. In the first fifteen days of July, there have 17 incidents. (3) The pace of action by the Yemeni Armed Forces has not decreased.
Who has been effective?
The issue of which side is being more effective has been nicely illustrated by the CEO of the Port of Eliat. The port is Israel’s only port on the Red Sea, and while not as important as the Mediterranean ports, it has an important function in trade with Asia.
In December, Gideon Golber, the CEO of the port, stated that the port had undergone an 85% decline in operations. Things were to get worse. He recently testified before a Knesset hearing. “The port has been non-operational for eight months due to attacks, meaning it has no revenue.” The port has been bankrupted, hence the Knesset hearing for financial assistance.
The larger impact upon the Israeli economy cannot be determined, given the general impact of wartime mobilisation in Israel. However, the impact of Ansarallah’s action on the wider action of the world economy is becoming very clear.
As we have seen above, the justification of bombing Yemen to deter Ansarallah has failed. Equally, if no more so, the justification of defending “the freedom of navigation” has failed.
The facts are eloquent. According to the IMF Portwatch website, transit trade in the Red Sea has suffered a serious fall which has been sustained throughout 2024. In normal times, 12% of world trade, and 30% of all global containers, transit the Bab al-Mandab.
At the start of Operation Poseidon Archer on January 12th, the transit trade through the Bab al-Mandab Strait was 2.2 million metric tons. On July 16th this had declined to 1.1 million metric tons. Under this military “Operation” trade in the Red Sea has been halved. It should also be noted that on July 16th 2023, the figure was 4.8 million metric tons – year on year a loss of more than 75% of trade! (4)
Where has this trade gone? On 16th July, the transit trade round the Cape of Good Hope was 9.1 million tons. This compares to 16th July 2023 when it was just 4.5 million metric tons.
The shipping companies have voted with their rudders. They do not regard Operation Poseidon Archer, Operation Prosperity Guardian or the EU Operation ASPIDES as sufficient protection. Instead they are accepting hugely increased transit costs and longer delivery times.
Who has been effective in this struggle? Not the US and allies. As the protesters on numerous Palestine demos have been chanting in Britain these past months: “Yemen make us proud. Turn another ship around.”
US government to escalate?
Of course, the impact of Ansarallah’s action on other states is not uniform. On July 19th, the Chair of the Suez Canal Authority, Osama Rabie, announced that the Authority’s annual revenue was down 23.4% for the fiscal year 2023-2024, For the Egyptian government this represents a considerable loss of revenue. Given President Sisi’s long standing contribution to enforcing the siege of Gaza, sympathy comes hard.
Britain would seemingly be hardly impacted. Yet there is evidence otherwise. On February 26th, the British Chamber of Commerce published the results of a survey covering over 1000 firms. More than half of the firms exporting from the UK had been impacted. More than half of manufacturers and business to consumer service firm (such as retailers) had also been impacted. The main issues reported were increased costs and delays. On July 1st, S&P Global reported that British manufacturing growth slowed in June as ongoing disruption in the Red Sea contributed to lower demand from overseas customers. “Shipping issues resulting from the Red Sea crisis, low stocks and supplies, insufficient vendor capacity and port issues all led to longer lead times”, according to the report.
Given the international impact of Ansarallah’s actions, the temptation for the US government will be to increase the attacks. The Wall Street Journal on 19th July reported that General Erik Kurilla, the Head of US Central Command, had warned US Defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin, that the mission against Ansarallah is “failing” and that more forceful action is needed.
Yet there should be plenty of reason for caution. According to Bryan Clark, a former US Navy submariner and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute: “This is the most sustained combat that the U.S. Navy has seen since World War II – easily no question. We’re sort of on the verge of the Houthis being able to mount the kinds of attacks that the U.S. can’t stop every time, and then we will start to see substantial damage.” (5)
On 12th July, after returning from duty in the Red Sea, Cmdr. Benjamin Orloff told reporters in Virginia Beach that most of the sailors, including him, weren’t used to being fired on given the nation’s previous military engagements in recent decades. “It was incredibly different. And I’ll be honest, it was a little traumatizing for the group. It’s something we don’t think about a lot until you’re presented with it.” he said. (6)
The tension was illustrated in a Wall Street Journal article on June 12th, whose print edition title was “Yemeni Rebels Tie Up U.S. Navy in the Red Sea”. Referring to actions on January 9th: “Houthi rebels in Yemen that day launched 18 drones and cruise missiles, along with the ballistic missile, at the Laboon and three other American destroyers, a U.S. aircraft carrier and a British warship in an attack that unfolded over a dozen hours.” Cmdr. Eric Bloomberg, on board the USS Laboon at the time, said: “I don’t think people really understand just how deadly serious it is what we’re doing and how under threat to ships continue to be. We only have to get it wrong once, the Houthis just have to get one through.” (5)
The US Navy claims that no hits have been reported against warships, though this is disputed by Ansarallah. What seems certain is that somewhere close to a 100 cargo ships have been hit.
A recent Foreign Policy article highlights how pressing the situation is becoming: “That the world’s premier navies appear to be struggling to subdue a band of insurgents raises painful questions about both the utility of sea power and the proficiency of the Western navies that are meant to carry the burden in any future showdown with a major rival such as China.” And: “Part of the problem is that the two naval forces – the U.S. and British “Prosperity Guardian” on the one hand and the European Union’s “Aspides” on the other – have two different missions. The Anglo-American force aims to intercept threats and strike at their origin on land; the Europeans have stuck closer to a straight escort mission to protect merchant shipping without taking the fight to the Houthis. Neither is working.” (7)
The Head of the EU mission, Aspides (“Shield”), Adm Cryparis is pressing the EU to more than double the fleet assigned the operation. This too is an admission of failure.
There is evidence that the escalation has already begun. On July 20th, supposedly in response to a single drone strike on Tel Aviv, the Israeli government launched air strikes on Hodeidah port. Immediate reports indicate extensive strikes against oil facilitiies, fuel tanks, the port’s wharf and cranes. Also targeted was the central power generation station which supplies the city. Large numbers of injuries were reported with extensive fires hindering the search for the injured and corpses. This is action against the major gateway for essential and humanitarian supplies to the majority of the Yemeni people at present. It is an action similar to the massacres of civilians in Gaza. Such action will have been carried out with the likely authorisation of the U.S. government. The flight path may have been across Jordan and Saudi Arabia, US allies and hosts to US forces.
How quickly such escalation can expand was captured in a report published by Middle East Eye on June 28th. The article cites an unnamed “senior US official” who quoted intelligence sources that Russian President Putin is considering providing Ansarallah with cruise missiles. The report continues that the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman intervened to stop Putin.(8) With the continued refusal of NATO supporting states to end their proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, it may be that US and Israeli escalation against Lebanon or Yemen will definitely persuade Putin.
The wisest stance for the US would be to seek an end to Israel’s war on Palestine – a condition which Ansarallah has made clear would result in ending its action. Lacking this, there will either been a dangerous escalation, or the continuation of a failed policy.
Current position in Yemen
The current political situation in Yemen is that there is an effective government based in Sana’a, where Ansarallah is organising a state for around 80% of the population. This covers a minority of the physical territory of Yemen, where much of the country is sparsely populated.
The remaining part of the country has no single governing authority. In part it is directly occupied by Saudi Arabia and UAE, utilising militias linked to different and contending parties – most significantly Al-Islah (Saudi supported) and the Southern Transitional Council (UAE supported), with Tareq Saleh’s forces in western Yemen representing part of the old GPC ruling party.
The supposedly “Internationaly Recognised Government” and its Presidential Leadership Council is an unstable alliance of these forces. As a government it only exists outside Yemen, the majority of ministers live in Saudi Arabia. The unity of these forces is based on hostility to Ansarallah and support for US imperialism in the Gulf.
The Saudi led war, which began in March 2015, has been under truce since April 2022. Despite the vastly superior technical forces and weaponry, the Saudis and Emiratis have essentially been defeated. The Saudi regime in launching the war planned to win in weeks, given its overwhelming predominance in air power. This proved insufficient for anything other than destroying Yemen’s infrastructure and economy. The coalition did not possess ground forces capable of supporting the invasion of Yemen’s sovereignty. The resilience of Ansarallah forces broke the offensives of the coalition.
However, the truce has not yet been combined with a serious peace process and inclusive political settlement. Consequently, the coalition, with US and British government backing, has kept a siege on the country. Negotiations have so far only yielded some prisoner exchanges, some easing of access to Hodeidah port, and a few flights from Sana’a airport to a single destination in Amman, Jordan. Overall the siege and state of tension have prevented a real resolution of Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, let alone its comprehensive rebuilding.
Out of a population of 38.7 million, 18.2 million Yemenis remain in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the UN. Of these, 9.8 million are children. 4.5 million people are internally displaced. All social and welfare systems have been substantially reduced by the invasion and siege. Hunger and malnutrition are widespread, alongside preventable diseases – 2024 has seen another revival of cholera. The UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen requires $2.71 billion for 2024 – up to 17th July only $641.9 million has been received.
The social catastrophe is difficult to grasp. Yemen was the poorest Arab nation, and one of the world’s poorest nations, before the war began. In 2014, according to the World Bank, Yemen’s GDP was $43.23 billion. By 2018, this figure had fallen to $21.61 billion. No GDP figures have been issued since then, but if the 2018 total is used and adjusted by IMF estimates for growth/decline since 2018, then the 2024 GDP will be around $19.84 billion.
The Yemeni people, after nearly ten years of siege, war and occupation, are trying to live on less than half of the resources that they held in 2015. This is the direct product of the Global North’s support for foreign intervention and blockade of an impoverished people, a policy currently being duplicated towards the Palestinians.
The overlay of Palestine on Yemen’s struggle for sovereignty
How have the actions of Ansarallah been received in the Arab world, and in Yemen? All serious reporting confirms that it has broadened support for Ansarallah, in line with the popular support for Palestine.
“There is no denying that the coalition strikes [US and UK air strikes] have, to a significant extent empowered the Houthis within Yemen and across the Arab world. Mindful of how anti-Israeli sentiments are shared by Yemenis across the country and its political spectrum, it has not been surprising to see Ansarallah boost its recruitment as a result of maritime attacks waged under the banner of defending the Palestinians.” (9)
In an interview conducted with Amwaj Media, on 20th February, Nabeel Khoury, former deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Yemen, stated that Ansarallah had skillfully bolstered public opinion across the country to their advantage. “Average Yemenis across the board have always been sympathetic to Palestinians, and Hamas had offices in Sana’a under the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh” he said. The same interview noted that there had been at least 2,000 rallies in support of Palestine between October and February.
Even an unremittingly hostile Financial Times article has to register Ansarallah’s growing popularity. “The Houthis have been gaining new fans across the Arab world, many of whom know little about the Islamist group’s history or increasingly repressive tactics in their home country. Their popularity, which seems to transcend religious divisions has surged since the war between Israel and Hamas erupted in October…”. And: “A poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted in late 2023 found that residents of Gaza and the occupied West Bank ranked Yemen’s response to the Israel-Hamas war as the most satisfying among regional actors”. And a 35 year-old Yemeni, living outside of Ansarallah’s controlled territory said: “Personally, I’ve never liked the Houthis … but what they are doing now for Palestine: it’s a good deed. And I’ll support anyone who’s making life harder for those who oppress the Palestinians, especially when they’re Yemeni like me.” (10)
Two influential Yemeni-American women activists were clear when interviewed by Truthout. Aisha Jumaan: “I would say that over 90 percent of Yemenis are supportive of the position on Gaza taken by Ansar Allah… The position that they took, in terms of blocking Israeli linked and Israeli -destined ships to Gaza, has resulted in lots of cracks in the coalition against Ansar Allah. And it’s across the board. There are a lot of other political groups in Yemen, whether it’s the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islah Party, whether it’s the secessionist Southern Transitional Council, all of these groups have prominent leadership break away and go to Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, to support Ansar Allah’s leadership there.”
And, Shireen Al-Adeimi: “I think the Houthis’ response to Gaza has garnered them more support from Yemenis, including many who were anti-Houthi before the war on Gaza. When it comes to Palestine, it’s a very clear cut situation for Yemenis to understand – the Houthis are seen as honourable. The response stands out in a region as the only folks standing up to Israel, despite having a lot more to lose than most people and despite limited technology. They’re using fishing boats to target vessels worth tens of millions of dollars.” (11)
Conclusion
There seems little immediate prospect of an end to the war on Gaza, given the refusal of the US government to apply any pressure upon Netanyahu to end the war. In these circumstances, the actions of Ansarallah, and the Yemeni people, are an inspiration for the global solidarity movement to refuse to give into despair.
For the anti-war and Palestinian solidarity movement in Britain there are important responsibilities. The British government is directly involved in maintaining the siege of Yemen, has forces inside Yemen, and is engaged in bombing Yemen. Given the remarkably bipartisan and generally uncritical support for US foreign policy in Parliament, it is likely that the Labour government will embrace any increased assaults upon the Yemeni people.
The Tory government under Sunak was supported by Starmer in refusing to acknowledge any connection between the actions in the Red Sea and the war on Gaza. The Israeli bombing of Hodeidah has demonstrated how absolutely connected they are.
Nor should we be distracted by fake distinctions between “the actions of Houthi terrorists” and the Yemeni people. On this issue, it is entirely evident that Ansarallah are acting on behalf of the Yemeni people. In comparison, the actions of pro-US Arab regimes have been flagrant breaches of faith with their own citizens.
In the coming months, we must continue demanding that the British government supports an immediate ceasefire for Gaza, that it ends arms sales to Israel, that it recognises the Palestinian state, etc. But we must integrate the demands for an end to bombing Yemen, an end to sanctions and supporting the siege, and for the withdrawal of all foreign occupying forces. The British government should also try to revive the corpse of British diplomacy by supporting an inclusive peace and political process for the Yemeni people. Free Palestine! Hands Off Yemen!
Notes
(1) “The Houthis’ Sovereign Solidarity with Palestine”, Stacey Philbrick Yadav, MERIP, 24/1/24; and “Yemen Has a Long Tradition of Solidarity With the Palestinian People”, Helen Lackner, Jacobin, 8/12/23
(2) “Assessing the Houthi War Effort Since October 2023”, Michael Knights, Combatting Terrorism Center, Vol 17 issue 4, April 2024
(3) From Aspides Threat Updates, published by EU with additional reports
(4) All figures are on a seven day moving average to avoid daily distortions. As reported on the IMF PortWatch website
(5) “US Navy faces its most intense combat since World War II etc.”, Jon Gambrell, AP, 4/6/24
(6) “US Navy pilots come home after months of shooting down Houthi missiles and drones”, Ben Finley, AP, 12/7/24
(7) “Why Can’t the U.S. Navy and Its Allies Stop the Houthis?”, Keith Johnson & Jack Detsch, Foreign Policy, 1/7/24
(8) “US Officials concerned Israeli offensive on Hezbollah could drag in Russia”, Sean Mathews, Middle East Eye, 28/6/24
(9) “Are the Houthis Winning In The Red Sea?”, Giorgio Cafiero, Responsible Statecraft, 17/6/24
(10) “‘Thank God for the Houthis’: why Arab world is backing Yemen rebels”, Raya Jalabi, Financial Times, 26/1/24
(11) “Still Facing US-Backed Famine, Yemenis Want to Save Gaza From the Same Fate”, Odeliya Matter, TRUTHOUT, 6/4/24